THE EVOLUTION OF CONNECTIVITY: A BRIDGE BEYOND by Gardner, Susan T.
 1 
THE EVOLUTION OF CONNECTIVITY: A BRIDGE BEYOND 
Susan T. Gardner 
Capilano University, North Vancouver, Canada, 
IAPL conference, London, 2009.  
Published in  
The Politics of Empathy: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives on an Ancient Phenomenon. Eds. Weber 
B., Marsal E., Dobashi T. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011. 51-59. 
 
7 words: empathy, social capital, connectivity, evolving connectivity, bonding, bridging, in-between 
 
 
Human’s seeming lack of empathy both for one another and for other life forms not only threatens 
human survival but the very web of life on this planet. And the situation looks even grimmer if we take 
into account the fact that inter-human connection, or what Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam 
refers to as “social capital,” appears to be decreasing at alarming rates.  In his book Bowling Alone, i 
Putnam marshals a mind-numbing array of data that shows that on virtually every conceivable 
measure, from political participation, to volunteering, to religious affiliation, to union membership, to 
participation in organized sport (hence the title), even to sharing dinner with friends, civic participation 
is plummeting to levels not seen for almost 100 years.  And we should care, Putnam argues, because 
connectivity is, on the one hand, inversely related to crime, while, on the other, positively related with 
economic prosperity, physical health, overall sense of personal well-being and how well education 
works.  
 
Given this growing concern over dissipating human bonds, it is hardly surprising that many are 
tempted by Richard Rorty’sii suggestion that we ought to try to ramp up inter-human connectivity by 
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engaging people in empathy-enhancing literature rather than continuing to desperately stoke the fires 
of moral connection by advocating a “rational” Kantian approach—an approach whose inadequacy 
seems empirically obvious. However, given, on the one hand, the problem that literature can divide as 
easily as it can connect, and, on the other, the fact that Kant’s universalization procedure can be used 
to legitimize pre-existing biases (e.g., I can will that, if I were like my enemy, I too should be killed), 
the challenge would seem to be that we need to find entirely new ways of connecting that transcends 
both sensuous and ethical bonding.  
 
The need for such a new kind of connectivity is suggested in Putnam’s own work when he reminds us 
that while bonding brings with it all the merits previously mentioned, it likewise tends to reinforce 
animosity toward those on the outside. Indeed—though Putnam never actually mentions this—it is not 
improbable to suppose that at least one psychological factor contributing to the dramatic drop in social 
capital might well be the revulsion of enlightened thinkers toward the inherent, often irrational, 
conformity and exclusivity that group membership entails. 
 
Putnam goes on to suggest—though virtually in passing—wherein such conformity-free connection 
might lie. He notes that instead of bonding with others—a process that creates what he describes as “a 
kind of sociological superglue,” it might be preferable to bridge towards others in a looser way, thus 
creating what he describes as “a kind a sociological WD-40,” iii presumably meaning that “bridging 
individuals” are more able to engage in relatively “squeak-free” interaction with a large variety of 
individuals. 
   
From a philosopher’s point of view, since Putnam’s research (presumably by necessity) focuses on 
bonded groups, the big question that he leaves untouched is what a bridging person would look like. 
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What kind of communicative style would fuel such bridging social connectivity? How might we 
articulate its guiding principle? 
 
A potential answer to these questions begins to materialize if we examine interconnectivity as it ideally 
emerges in a collage of Mead’siv depiction of self-consciousness, Rorty’sv plea to enhance empathy 
through literature, Kant’s categorical imperative, Habermas’vi “communicative rationality,” Buber’s vii 
“meeting in the in-between,” and Kierkegaard’sviii “teleological suspension of the ethical.” 
Specifically, such a collage (see figure 1) suggests that connectivity is a developmental phenomenon 
that evolves from a base of pre-reflexive compassion (exhibited by animals and young children), to a 
more imaginatively-based empathy (powered by literal and literary experience), to a more rational 
emotion-sparing sympathy (of the sort that emerges through universalizing one’s intents), and finally to 
a powering up of a latent potential to be at the ready to hear foreign calls of those who reach out in a 







DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL OF CONNECTIVITY 
 
1. Pre-reflexive compassion (exhibited by animals and young children, and which fuels the 
development of self consciousness, i.e., I must care for you in order to care how you judge my 
behaviour from your point of view (Mead)), 
2. A more imaginatively-based empathy (powered by literal and literary experience, i.e., I might 
be less inclined to bully the other either if I myself have been bullied or if I read of the trauma 
of others who have been bullied (Rorty)), 
3. A more rational emotion-sparing sympathy (of the sort that emerges through universalizing 
one’s intents, e.g., since I value myself as member of the Kingdom of Ends, I will not bully 
because I cannot will that indiscriminant victimization of those less powerful become a 
universal law of nature (Kant)), 
4. A bridging attitude toward others accompanied by a commitment to follow the path that 
emerges in the communicative “in-between” (i.e., a willingness to try to hear what others say 
from their point of view, and to accept the risk of being sufficiently self-revealing that others 
likewise can understand the background that leads me to the position that I myself hold, along 
with the commitment to “objectively” judge, through a process of falsification, which path 






To argue that there are multiple levels of connectivity—with each evolving out of the preceding 
stage—is not in any way to suggest that these modes of connectivity are mutually exclusive either in 
any one person, or in any one situation. Indeed, one of the foundational assumptions of this 
developmental model is that the capacity to discern what sort of connectivity-response is appropriate in 
the ever-changing situations in which we find ourselves must surely be what emotional intelligenceix is 
all about. As well, since this model advocates that each succeeding level brings with it a potential to 
connect with ever-larger numbers of different individuals, it is theoretically self-affirming in that it is 
just what one would expect of a developmental paradigm. x   
 
The most radical suggestion of this developmental model is the claim that there is a step beyond 
universalizability—what heretofore has been considered by many as the pinnacle of both self-
development and inter-human connectivity. This paradigm suggests, by contrast, that we can go 
further—indeed that we must go further in this world of exponentially overlapping interconnections—
and challenge ourselves and one another to awaken our potential to reach out to, but wait for, entirely 
new ways of seeing the world—ways that by definition are not pre-describable, but which offer the 
possibility of mutual self-transformation that can fuel a transcendent inter-human connection.  An 
examination of what “this step beyond” might look like is the focus of this paper.  We will begin by 
reiterating the problems with accepting step 3 as the ultimate to which humans can morally aspire.  
 
Problems with universalizability 
In his 1965 seminal book, Freedom and Reasonxi, R. M Hare, then the White Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Oxford University, admitted that, when it comes to a fanatical evildoer, a universalizing 
moralizer has nothing to say, e.g., in the face of a Nazi who claims that he would wish to be 
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exterminated if he were a Jew, reason has no right even to condemn. xii But, if universalizability is so 
rational, why does it fail so badly against fanaticism? 
 
The difficulty is anchored in the fact that universalization relies too heavily on the “coherence theory 
of truth,” e.g., that a creditor comes to believe that s/he ought not to hang, draw, and quarter a debtor 
because (presumably) the creditor herself would not wish to be hung drawn and quartered were s/he a 
debtor. Universalization, thus, does not work against a fanatic such as a Nazi who so loathes Jews that 
he claims that were he a Jew he would wish to be exterminated because from the agent’s point of view, 
there is a no contradiction between his maxim and his principles.xiii 
 
So let’s look closely at what has gone wrong here. What has brought this entire so-called rational 
discourse to a screeching halt is not a problem with reason, but rather a problem with sentiment. What 
has gone wrong here is that the Nazi has no empathy with his imagined self as a Jew. What has gone 
wrong here is a lack of what some have referred to as the “ethical imagination.”xiv What has gone 
wrong here is that the so-called rational universalizing elephant turns out to stand on the back of an 
empathizing turtle—and its turtles all the way down, i.e., the degree to which a universalizing 
procedure ever works is always a function of the sentiment of the universalizerxv.  
 
It’s no wonder, then, that so many are tempted by Rorty’s argument that we would do far better to 
engage people in sentiment-enhancing literature (something that Harexvi himself flirts with but 
discards) than to advocate that they adopt a “rational” Kantian universalization procedure.  Such a 
retreat, however, is counterproductive in that the efficacy of sentiment-enhancing literature depends 
even more heavily on preconceived bias than universalization, i.e., not only would a Nazi be 
disinclined to access media sympathetic to the Jews, our Nazi would be positively attracted to media 
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that closely mirrored his own viewpoint, a phenomenon of “like attracting like” that is evident in 
contemporary website access.xvii  
 




Perhaps the most obvious place to start is with the philosopher who advocated moving beyond 
universalizability over 150 years ago. Though his target was the development of an authentic 
connection with the divine, nonetheless Kierkegaard has a lot to teach us through his notion of the 
“teleological suspension of the ethical.” In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard outlines three “modes of 
living” that are related to one another in a developmental order: the esthete, the ethical, and the Knight 
of Faith. If one imagines decision-making as being more or less “individually-” as opposed to “group-
focused,” these three stages can be depicted as representing the mirror image of an hourglass; a person 
is an individual at the esthete level in the sense of being driven by her unique sensuous nature; she 
becomes representative of a community (either actual or imaginative) at the ethicalxviii or 
universalizing level and in so doing becomes indistinguishable from others who adopt similar rules; 
while at the third level, s/he comes back to herself when s/he takes the leap of faith by making a 
personal passionate commitment, over and over again, to engage in actions s/he believes will define 
her as the person s/he believes s/he ought to strive to become. From Kierkegaard’s point of view, this 
last stage is important because it is as an individual that we are judged by God. However, if we rewrap 
Kierkegaard’s Knight in the folds of Martin Buber’s notion of “meeting in the in-between,” it gives 
birth to the more secular suggestion that the way to move beyond the limitations of the 
universalizability lies in moving beyond the comfort of the socially-accepted and the predictably-
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praised and, instead, embark on the lonely road of walking out to the other “as one truly is” in the 
confidence that one will meet the other in his/her authenticity.  
 
In his famous and lovely book, I and Thou, Buber describes this “meeting in the in-between” against 
the background of the world divided in two, in accordance with humanity’s twofold attitude.  These 
attitudes can be characterized by the primary words of I-Thou and I-It (where He or She can replace It). 
The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being,xix  and relationship within I-Thou 
must always be direct; it cannot be mediated by a system of ideas, or foreknowledge, or fancy, or aim, 
or lust.xx I cannot approach the other as a problem to be solved or as a person to be fixed. In an I-Thou 
relationship, I become present to the other. And since, through our honesty, I see you and you see me, 
hate becomes impossible because “hate is by nature blind. Only a part of a being can be hated”xxi. To 
meet another in the in-between is to see the exclusiveness of the otherxxii —an exclusiveness that one 
cannot explain to anyone else; one is alone with it.xxiii  
 
Within the schema outlined in Figure 1, this “meeting in the in-between” can be conceptualized as a 
connection that differs in kind from all three of the earlier developmental stages of connection (i.e., 
primitive compassion, empathy, and connection through universalization techniques) in that it cannot 
be managed from one side or by one person. You can only meet the other in the in between if the other 
comes out to meet you, and since you must meet somewhere in the metaphorical middle, you inevitably 
meet here as “subjects” rather than “objects.” What lives here is what Kierkegaard referred to as the 
“subjective truth” of participatory agents in relation, i.e., each is truthfully who they are, as opposed to 
“objective truth” that emerges through the contemplative stance of the disengaged observor. xxiv  
 
This unique characteristic of the I-Thou relation, and its distinction from I-It relations, finds a 
reflection in Jurgen Habermas’ description of “communicative” as opposed to “strategic” action. 
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According to Habermas, the former strives toward reaching understanding, while the latter strives 
toward exerting influence.xxv  And like Buber, Habermas emphasizes that success in communicative 
action is always a function of both the speaker and the hearerxxvi. Specifically, he says of 
communicative action that:  
 
The independent performances that are here demanded from the subjects consist of something 
different than rational choices steered by one’s own preferences; what these subjects must 
perform is the kind of moral and existential self-reflection that is not possible without the one 
taking up the perspective of the other.  Only thus can there emerge a new kind of social 
integration among individuals who are individualized and not merely manipulated. The 
participants must themselves generate their socially integrated forms of life by recognizing 
each other as autonomous subjects capable of action and, beyond this, as individuated beings 
for which they have taken responsibilityxxvii. 
 
The distinguishing feature of this Habermasian model is that, unlike Buber, Habermas stresses that 
rationality lives—in fact can only be actualized—in the in-between. According to Habermas, I must 
recognize that whenever I speak, I raise what he refers to as a “criticizable validity claim for the 
proposition p, a claim that the hearer can accept or reject with good reason.”xxviii  Thus, in order to 
claim the dignity and autonomy that Kant argued adhered to rationality, I must, according to 
Habermas, reflect on whether what I have said is vulnerable to the sort of falsification that my hearer 
suggests. I cannot, in other words, assert that my claim is true merely by referring to some a priori 
metaphysic (hence the penetrating title of one of Habermas’ book, Postmetaphysical Thinking); I must, 
rather, remain constantly open to the challenge that my claim may turn out to be inadequate from the 
other’s point of view. Specifically, he says:  
Anyone participating in argumentation shows his rationality or lack of it by the manner in 
which he handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or against claims. If he is “open to 
argument,” he will either acknowledge the force of those reasons or seek to reply to them, 
either way he will deal with them in a “rational” manner. If he is “deaf to argument,” by 
contrast, he may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic assertions, and 
either way he fails to deal with the issues rationally.xxix  
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Habermas goes to say (quoting Robin Horton who, in studying Evans-Pritchard’s observations of the 
justificatory practices of the Azande, observed) that:  
Here then we have two basic predicaments: the “closed”—characterized by lack of awareness 
of alternatives, sacredness of beliefs, and anxiety about threats to them; and the “open”—
characterized by awareness of alternatives, diminished sacredness of beliefs and diminished 
anxiety about threats to them.xxx 
 
Thus, in other words, according to Habermas, if I am prepared to open any and all of my beliefs, 
judgements, and opinions (as opposed to, importantly, my character as a person) to the critical gaze of 
the other, who likewise comes out to meet me with the same openness, and since neither of us can ever 
predict in advance what might emerge in the ensuing conversation, we can redefine Buber’s notion of 
speaking “with the whole being” as being prepared to lay bare whatever is called to the table in this 




In conclusion, then, if we take Kierkegaard’s mirror image of an hourglass as a model, we can 
hypothesize that the contemporary massive decrease in social “bonding” is not necessarily a bad 
thing—though we need to be sure that the momentum toward “individualization” is forward toward 
bridging, rather than backward toward self-indulgence. And in order to do that, a collage of the 
theoretical frameworks touched on here suggests that that we ought to embrace both educational and, 
(a la Rorty) literary initiatives that reinforce a post metaphysical portrait of the best to which humans 
can aspire.  
 
This new hero will not be an individual who gallantly hangs on to sacred beliefs, who believes that “if 
you are not with us, you are against us,” or who is prepared to make great sacrifices to ensure that what 
s/he and her gang know to be right wins the day; nor will s/he be of the arrogantly confident sort who 
takes pleasure in dismissing others with a withering look or delight in ridiculing her opponent; nor, 
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even, will s/he be one who is self-deprecating and self-sacrificing in the name of martyring herself to 
the good that others require.   
 
Indeed, this new hero will understand that attempting to “altruistically” connect solely for the sake of 
the other is both arrogant and de-humanizing in that it assumes that only she has anything of worth to 
give. She understands that since all our actions are self-defining, we cannot help but treat others as 
“means,” but that we can refrain from treating others as “means only” by reaching out in the confident 
expectation that both of us will grow should genuine meeting transpire, but that that growth will be 
contingent on the degree to which both of us are committed to unobstructed unmediated rational 
communicative discourse.  This new hero, then, will be an individual who is compassionate, rational, 
non-ideological, eager to engage opposing views, and swift to change positions that do not withstand 
falsification. She will be an individual who, because she changes according to what she estimates to be 
the best that she can glen through discourse to which she is always open, is almost impossible to 
describe, and hence whose actualization will inevitably be a challenge to measure, as she walks her 
unique road in the faithxxxi that there may always be a better way, and that therefore there may always 
be a better day. 
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